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ABSTRACT
Political actors participate in policy debates as an advocacy strategy to
influence political opponents and public opinion. They often engage in cross-
sectoral advocacy by participating in multiple adjacent debates. To
investigate what factors influence cross-sectoral advocacy in policy debates,
we examined advocacy coalitions in two health policy debates in the UK –
the regulation of sugar-sweetened beverages and alcoholic drinks. We
predicted cross-sectoral advocacy efforts across 237 actors, such as health
charities, manufacturers, or retailers, as a function of their belief system
alignment relative to their advocacy coalition. In a methodological
innovation, Bayesian item response models were applied to policy beliefs
stated publicly by actors in eleven newspapers to measure the ideological
positions of actors and beliefs relative to their advocacy coalition. Extreme
belief alignment relative to one’s coalition, a small spread of stated beliefs,
and a strong engagement were found to explain cross-sectoral advocacy.
KEYWORDS Advocacy coalitions; cross-sectoral advocacy; discourse networks; item response theory;
policy belief systems; policy debates
Introduction
Political actors often have a vested interest in specific policies. To achieve their
policy goals, they engage in advocacy. Advocacy efforts can take different
forms, such as lobbying or engagement in policy debates. When actors partici-
pate in policy debates, they try to sway public opinion or influence their politi-
cal opponents (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991).
Each actor holds a complex system of policy beliefs. They feed into an
actor’s decision on what to contribute to a policy debate, when, and how
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(Leifeld, 2017; Sabatier, 1988, 1998). Policy beliefs also guide actors’ coordi-
nation in policy networks in the pursuit of policy objectives (Henry et al.,
2011; Ingold, 2011). Within each policy subsystem, actors can be grouped
empirically into advocacy coalitions by the extent of overlap in their belief
systems (Sabatier, 1988, 1998).
Actors who engage in policy debates can draw on different kinds of
resources in their pursuit of policy objectives. Such resources include
money, connections to journalists and other actors, a central position in
the policy network, formal authority, membership in policy forums, and repu-
tation (Ingold & Leifeld, 2016). Another resource they can use is cross-sectoral
advocacy – where actors engage in multiple related but distinct debates – for
example in the regulation of different harmful products. In this contribution,
we aim to explain why some actors engage in cross-sectoral advocacy efforts
and make use of this resource while others commit to a single policy debate.
There are several reasons for engaging in cross-sectoral advocacy: First,
actors can use connections to other subsystems to develop a better under-
standing of the effectiveness of their arguments or frames. Cross-sectoral advo-
cacy will therefore give actors an informational advantage to position
themselves strategically in each of the debates (Brandenberger et al., 2021).
Second, actors who reach across policies can more effectively tie different
policy coalitions together. Doing so increases the network embeddedness of
the coalitions with each other and thereby their information flows and
shared strategies (Heaney & Leifeld, 2018; Junk, 2019; Mahoney, 2007). A
third reason for using cross-sectoral advocacy is that actors who participate
in multiple debates can find overarching, integrated solutions to policy pro-
blems (Candel, 2017). Such efforts are known as policy integration (Tosun &
Lang, 2017; Trein et al., 2019). Fourth, cross-sectoral advocacy is a resource in
pursuing policy objectives because it unites advocacy actors under a
common umbrella of arguments and frames: It leads to more ‘frame bundling’
and stronger integration and persuasiveness of arguments, which in turn
increases the perceived cohesion of actors in a coalition (Leifeld & Haunss,
2012). Cross-subsystem involvement has been described in different contexts
also under the labels boundary spanning (Brandenberger et al., 2021) and hori-
zontal, or cross-boundary, policy entrepreneurship (Faling et al., 2019).
Although cross-sectoral advocacy can serve as a resource in the pursuit of
policy objectives, not every political actor engages in it. But what explains this
variation in cross-sectoral advocacy efforts? Currently, the drivers of this vari-
ation between actors are not well understood. A better understanding is
required if we want interest intermediation to be pluralist, transparent, and
equitable: If one coalition draws on such resources while another one loses
out, it may lead to adverse outcomes like, in the extreme case, regulatory
capture (Laffont & Tirole, 1991). In addition to improving democratic policy
making, diagnosing differences in cross-sectoral advocacy should also
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matter for any particular policy subsystem in a normative way. Actors should
learn to realise their cross-policy advocacy potential and exploit it to attain
their policy goals (Faling et al., 2019).
One plausible explanation for the variation in cross-sectoral advocacy
efforts lies in the way in which actors’ individual beliefs are aligned with
the collective belief system of their coalition. A belief system consists of
beliefs at different layers of generality. Each layer contains specific beliefs
or frames actors can support or reject (Leifeld, 2013, 2017), such as
different policy instrument preferences or arguments. By adopting some
policy beliefs while not adopting or rejecting other beliefs, actors display a
belief system alignment relative to the other actors in their coalition. Some
actors display moderate overall positions while other actors are ideologically
more extreme. For example, an industry actor with an extreme alignment
relative to its industry-led coalition may reject all beliefs related to the regu-
lation of a commodity and its alleged negative health consequences and only
support self-regulation. In contrast, an industry actor with a moderate align-
ment may accept some kinds of regulation as long as there is no outright ban
of a product and may acknowledge mixed scientific evidence on negative
health consequences of the product. The relative belief alignment of an
actor with its coalition may explain whether the actor engages in a single
policy debate or cross-sectoral efforts – but there are multiple plausible
ways in which this may happen. Actors with a more extreme alignment
may have a stronger interest in the issue and thus engage in adjacent
debates as well – or they may be more specialised and thus focus all their
attention on the issue. Below, we will pick these theoretical mechanisms
apart and provide a first empirical test future research can build on.
A complication arises in this theory test: There is no established way of
measuring belief system alignment. The reason is that the position of the
beliefs relative to one another in any policy debate is unknown and subjective.
For example, within a coalition it is unclear and may be disputed whether the
belief that a policy will improve population health is more, or less, extreme than
the belief that the policy will improve public financial resources because the two
beliefs are of a categorical nature. Would an actor adopting one or the other be
more extreme? Only by considering the whole empirical belief system simul-
taneously can the latent ideological positions of the beliefs be determined –
and consequently the alignment of the actors holding them be measured.
To accomplish the measurement of belief system alignment, we propose
employing item response theory, a family of measurement models from edu-
cational and psychological testing and with many existing applications to ideo-
logical scaling. Measuring belief system alignment in this way overcomes an
obstacle often encountered in research on advocacy coalitions: Ideological het-
erogeneity of actors within coalitions is routinely ignored, and coalitions are
treated as monolithic blocs (e.g., Cobb & Coughlin, 1998; Savell et al., 2016).
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Against this backdrop, the present article makes three contributions. First,
we propose a methodology for the systematic measurement of the relative
ideological location of each belief and each actor toward each other in the col-
lective belief system of a coalition, debate, or subsystem. The Bayesian item
response model is applied to actors’ stated beliefs in press articles. This
approach yields estimates of actors’ ideological positions on a latent left-right
dimension (the actor’s ability parameter), relative positions of beliefs (the item
difficulty parameter), and the discriminatory power of each belief for the
coalition structure of the policy subsystem (the item discrimination parameter),
which can be interpreted as a measure of the alignment of a belief with a
coalition. We derive two measures of belief system alignment from these esti-
mates: the relative location of an actor in the belief system of its coalition and
the spread of an actor’s beliefs relative to the collective belief system.
Second, using these methods, we present a joint analysis of two health
policies and the public debates surrounding their introduction: Minimum
Unit Pricing for alcohol (MUP) and the Soft Drinks Industry Levy (SDIL).
These policies were selected because they were both originally considered
as policy interventions for introduction into the United Kingdom (UK) and
because they would both reduce the harmful consumption of unhealthy pro-
ducts across the population by using fiscal measures – similarities that qualify
them in principle for cross-sectoral advocacy (Buckton et al., 2019; Collin et al.,
2017; Fergie et al., 2019; Savell et al., 2016). Manufacturers, retailers, think
tanks, and associations were part of an informal advocacy coalition in the
media trying to contain regulation, while an advocacy coalition of health
charities and advocacy groups, government advisory bodies, professional
associations, and scientists worked to expand regulation (see Cobb & Cough-
lin, 1998; Schaub & Metz, 2020; Tosun & Schaub, 2017 on policy containers
and expanders). We find that, somewhat ironically, those seeking to
contain policy find themselves engaging in more cross-sectoral advocacy
efforts than those seeking to expand regulation. But the variation in cross-
sectoral advocacy is not fully explained by containment.
Third, we therefore develop theoretical ideas on how the belief system
alignment of an actor relative to its coalition may help explain whether the
actor engages in cross-sectoral advocacy efforts. We exploit variation
between actors to put these hypotheses to a first test. While a broader test
across a range of sectors and policies will be needed eventually, the analysis
provides an initial credibility test of the belief system alignment hypothesis.
Belief system alignment
Belief system alignment has two aspects: the location of an actor relative to
its coalition and the spread of the actor’s beliefs around this location. We will
consider each in turn below.
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Because we are examining two similar policies, we assume that the policy
debates can be broken down to a single left-right dimension. In the regu-
lation of unhealthy commodities, the left-right scale can be interpreted as
a dimension ranging from pro-health interests – trying to regulate products
as rigorously as possible and claiming serious health hazards – to pro-industry
interests, trying to avert regulation, insisting on their freedom to sell products
as much as possible, and disputing scientific evidence on the harm of their
products. There is an absolute zero position at the center of the dimension.
Clustering of actor and belief positions on the left and on the right of the
zero point marks the advocacy coalitions on each side. There are moderate
actors and beliefs taking a middle-ground position on either side. There are
also extreme actors and beliefs close to the end points of the scale on
either side. The absolute distance from the zero point in the middle to
each actor’s or belief’s estimated position indicates its extremeness or its
location relative to its coalition, from moderate to extreme.
Extremeness of ideology
Holding an extreme ideological position within one’s coalition may affect
cross-sectoral advocacy efforts in several ways. As either a positive or a nega-
tive association between the two seems plausible, we will formulate the
association as two opposing working hypotheses (i.e., an undirected hypoth-
esis with two underlying explanations): the policy specialisation hypothesis
and the policy integration hypothesis.
One possibility is that actors with more extreme policy beliefs avoid cross-
sectoral advocacy because they specialise in a narrowly defined issue and
direct all their attention to the policy. A specialised actor may have vested
interests in this one specific policy or in its containment. Its extreme beliefs
reflect the stakes the actor faces. For example, a producer of one specific
commodity may strongly prefer the containment of regulation of this com-
modity but may not care about other products. Because of these high
stakes, the actor will be outspoken and display extreme policy beliefs in
order to sway public opinion and its opponents in the debate. If the actor
had a more diverse product portfolio, perhaps including healthier products,
it would take a less extreme position on this one issue, but it would also
try to participate in multiple debates around different kinds of food and
divide its attention. For example, a producer of spirits is specialised, outspo-
ken, and displays extreme policy beliefs around the regulation of alcoholic
drinks but perhaps not about sugar-sweetened beverages – while a retailer
can sell different products and may display more moderate beliefs on the
regulation of each one of them. On the other end of the spectrum, a
cancer charity is less specialised and possibly less ideologically extreme
than an obesity- or addiction-specific advocacy group on each specific
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issue and may need to divide its attention to fulfill its mission. Hence more
extreme policy beliefs may be associated with policy specialisation rather
than cross-sectoral advocacy.
Another possibility is that extreme policy beliefs are associated with cross-
sectoral advocacy and policy integration. Exhibiting strong policy views in a
coalition might imply a desire to regulate (or fend off regulation) across mul-
tiple processes and find a unified solution. If more interests are at stake at
once for an actor, the actor will more strongly support or oppose regulation
and engage in multiple policy debates. Finding common, overarching regu-
latory frameworks for multiple products will motivate the most extreme
health charities and the most extreme industry actors to invest in cross-
debate advocacy because the payoffs of policy success are proportionally
higher. Hence extreme policy beliefs can lead to policy integration through
cross-sectoral advocacy.
Spread of an actor’s policy beliefs
In addition to the ideological location of an actor, the spread of an actor’s
policy beliefs defines an actor’s belief system alignment with its coalition.
An actor can display a narrowly defined ideological position (small spread)
or a large uncertainty around the expected ideological position of the actor
(large spread). Ideological spread is operationalised by the variance of the
ideological position estimate of an actor in the Bayesian item response
model. Like the extremeness of ideology, its spread may have a positive or
a negative relationship with cross-sectoral advocacy. Three different under-
lying mechanisms may account for the positive or negative association:
belief variance, self-contradictions, or engagement.
First, an actor may display a large or small variance in beliefs. For example,
an actor can hold several extreme beliefs and several moderate beliefs.
Holding a diverse portfolio of policy beliefs may be associated with cross-sec-
toral involvement because varied beliefs cover different cross-sectoral
aspects of regulation. For example, a health charity may both state that regu-
lation will improve population health and that the policy being debated needs
to be part of a package of measures. Holding both beliefs rather than only the
first one will increase the estimated positional variance and may at the same
time indicate oversight of multiple sectors, such as alcohol and sugar regu-
lation. Oversight of multiple sectors is also required from office-seeking poli-
ticians and parties, who seek public attention and try to generate votes by
participating in policy debates. Such motivations would translate into a
large spread of beliefs and engagement in cross-sectoral activity. Hence
more belief variance should be associated with more cross-sectoral advocacy.
Second, a large belief spread can be caused by self-contradictions. They
occur when an actor states both support and rejection of a policy belief,
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for instance in the news media. Actors may simply do so because beliefs may
be intrinsically at odds across two policy sectors. For example, believing that
there is enough medical evidence to support the regulation of alcohol may
not necessarily imply believing that there is enough medical evidence to
support regulation of sugar in beverages or vice-versa. If aggregated across
debates, the actor will both support and reject the stance that there is
enough scientific evidence for regulation of unhealthy commodities. Such
seemingly inconsistent beliefs will increase the variance of beliefs and the
spread of ideological position estimates. A larger spread of ideology may
thus be associated with a greater engagement in cross-sectoral policy
advocacy.
Third, a larger spread of policy beliefs may arise from superficial engage-
ment with a policy. An actor who has a strong interest in (the containment
of) a policy will hold, and publicly state, many policy beliefs. An actor
whose interests are not as much at stake will hold some policy beliefs but
will be uncertain on others and will refrain from stating positions on these
beliefs publicly. The fewer policy beliefs the actor states, the more uncertain
the actor’s position and the larger the variance of the positional estimate.
Hence a lack of interest and low stakes imply a large ideological spread –
and engagement with only one sector rather than cross-sectoral advocacy
efforts.
Policy belief spread may therefore either increase or decrease cross-sec-
toral advocacy efforts. If the spread or uncertainty is primarily caused by
belief variance or contradictory positions across debates, we expect that a
larger spread of beliefs leads to more cross-sectoral advocacy efforts. If the
ideological spread is caused by a lack of engagement and many unstated
beliefs, we expect that it leads to less cross-sectoral advocacy. In the analysis
below, we will first test the aggregate effect of the spread of ideology and
then, in a separate model, the three possible mechanisms through which it
may operate.
If belief spread operates through a lack of engagement with the policy, we
should also expect this to intervene in the extremeness hypothesis. An actor
who shows a large variance in estimated belief positions because of low
engagement will unlikely hold extreme policy beliefs. If engagement
matters, both extremeness of position and spread of policy beliefs should
be associated with it.
Finally, we include several control variables. We account for policy expan-
ders and containers (Cobb & Coughlin, 1998; Schaub & Metz, 2020; Tosun &
Schaub, 2017) by controlling for whether an actor’s estimated policy position
is in the PRO-regulation (expander) coalition and by controlling for specific
actor types like manufacturers, retailers, etc. Finally, we control for the fre-
quency with which actors state their beliefs because it may affect policy
specialisation or integration as well as cross-sectoral advocacy.
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Case study and data
National debates around two fiscal policies designed to address unhealthy
commodity consumption and improve population health were selected for
a joint analysis: Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) for alcohol, introduced in Scot-
land (May 2018) and Wales (March 2020); and the Soft Drinks Industry Levy
(SDIL), introduced across the UK in April 2018. Both controversial policies
resulted in significant national-level debates with clear polarisation in stake-
holder views. There is mounting evidence that the alcohol, ultra-processed
food, and drink industries use similar strategies to the tobacco industry in
efforts to undermine effective health policies (Freudenberg, 2014; Moodie
et al., 2013 ). But unlike the tobacco industry, manufacturers of alcohol and
ultra-processed food and drink products are often identified as potential part-
ners in multi-sectoral health initiatives (Collin et al., 2017) – although these
unhealthy commodity industries (UCIs) are increasingly identified as major
drivers of non-communicable disease (NCD) epidemics (Freudenberg,
2014). The recent introduction of policies tackling the health harms caused
by UCIs indicate a new willingness of governments to adopt a regulatory
approach rather than relying on insufficient voluntary initiatives and positive
nudge approaches to improve public health.
UCIs are known to use the mass media to try to persuade the public and
policymakers to support or oppose new legislation. In the lead-up to the
introduction of such legislation, the news media play a critical role in
framing the issues, presenting opinion and attracting public and policy
support (Hilton et al., 2020). As the advertising and marketing activities of
UCI retailers and manufacturers have been curbed by regulation, media
influence has become an increasingly important resource for UCIs. This is
especially true in politically charged pricing policy debates, such as MUP
for alcohol and SDIL, where industry efforts to disrupt the introduction of
these pricing policies have been significant (Hilton et al., 2020).
Smith et al. (2016) suggest examining comparisons of cross-policy advo-
cacy efforts and the network of actors in them to elucidate interests, strat-
egies, and actions that are common across industry sectors. Collin et al.
(2017) also suggest the importance of exploring the actions of key stake-
holders working across different UCIs, drawing attention to large single cor-
porations whose interests penetrate multiple industries.
Sharing of ideologies and policy beliefs across UCIs working to oppose
legislation is also evident. Comparing alcohol and tobacco strategies and
arguments, Savell et al. (2016) suggest that there are several commonalities,
including both sectors providing skewed interpretations of evidence while
also promoting voluntary codes, based on establishing themselves as
acting responsibly in relation to health. Petticrew et al. (2017) have noted
commonalities in use of ‘complexity’ arguments across food, beverage,
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alcohol and gambling industry documents. Looking across separate studies
of media representations of MUP and SDIL, commonalities are also evident
in Buckton et al. (2019) and Fergie et al. (2019). However, systematic compari-
son of similarities and differences in belief systems of these policy problems,
solutions, and impacts, as well as the determinants of cross-policy advocacy
efforts, has not been undertaken – with one exception: Hilton et al. (2020)
compared the debates using network analysis – but without a focus on
explaining cross-policy advocacy. Their comparison tentatively suggested
‘greater cross-sector collaboration among policy opponents than propo-
nents’ and ‘that, in seeking policy congruence, there may be a space for
further cross-sector public health advocacy, by presenting arguments
across policy debates in support of their counterparts.’
To investigate the belief systems and any resulting cross-policy advocacy
activities across MUP and SDIL further, a media content analysis was con-
ducted using eleven leading national UK newspapers (for more details, see
Hilton et al., 2020). Each newspaper article was screened for instances
where political actors were reported to support or reject policy beliefs –
more specifically, secondary aspects in the terminology of the advocacy
coalition framework. 63 policy beliefs were inductively identified in this
way, and each actor’s stances on the beliefs were recorded. We call obser-
vations of actors referring to beliefs statements. For the MUP policy debate,
1924 statements by 152 individuals from 87 organisations (e.g., companies,
parties, associations) were coded in 348 articles, covering May 2011 to
November 2012. For the SDIL debate, 3883 statements by 214 individuals
from 175 organisations were coded in 511 articles covering May 2015 to
November 2016. About 29 policy beliefs were present in both debates
while 17 were unique to MUP and another 17 were unique to SDIL. The
manual coding was conducted using the software Discourse Network Analy-
zer. Two coders concurrently coded one debate each and synchronised
their inductive codebook regularly and discussed any differences to ensure
reliability. For each observation, the person, organisation, policy belief, and
a binary agreement variable indicating support of, or opposition to, the
belief by the actor was recorded. The result was a comprehensive national-
level media dataset covering actors and the secondary-aspect layer of their
belief systems, which, according to Sabatier (1998), is the belief system
layer that characterises coalitions within policy processes (as opposed to
the wider subsystem).
Methods
The dataset was recoded into an n× k binary matrix with belief categories j as
column labels and actors i as row labels, with zeros denoting more instances
of rejection of a belief by the actor than instances of support and ones
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denoting more support than rejection. Actor-belief combinations that did not
occur empirically were coded as missing values, NA, which effectively
increased the uncertainty around the estimation of an actor’s position,
leading to a higher spread of the actor’s belief system around the estimated
ability parameter.
With this data structure, a one-dimensional item response model was esti-
mated using Gibbs sampling (Albert, 1992), as implemented in theMCMCpack
R package by Martin et al. (2011). Item response theory was originally
designed to estimate the ability of students and the difficulty of a test ques-
tion and its ability to discriminate between good and poor students (Albert,
1992). Item response models are routinely used in political science to scale
legislators and parties on a latent ideological left-right dimension using
roll-call voting records (Clinton et al., 2004). Däubler and Benoit (2017)
demonstrated the efficacy of IRT models in manual content analysis of ideo-
logical statements in party manifestos. The item response model can be
expressed as an overparameterised probit model of the form
pij = F(bjui − aj)
where index j denotes items (= beliefs), index i denotes individuals (= actors),
pij is the probability of individual i to get item j right (i.e., to have a one, rather
than zero, in cell Yij of the matrix), F is the standard normal cumulative dis-
tribution function (the inverse link function of the probit model), aj is the
(latent) difficulty of the item, ui is the ability of the individual, and bj is the
ability of the item to discriminate between individuals’ abilities. In the
product, the item discrimination parameter ‘modifies’ the ability of the indi-
vidual. The joint likelihood for all observations in Y is the product of the indi-
vidual probabilities over all i and j indices. While the MLE can be obtained in
the E-M algorithm by making additional assumptions to ensure identifiability,
Bayesian estimation using Gibbs sampling is nowadays the standard
approach to estimation, with identification by drawing from a multivariate
normal distribution for the individual and item parameters and adding con-
straints for avoiding position flipping along the MCMC chain (Martin et al.,
2011). The IRT models were estimated with 3.5 million iterations, of which
the first 500,000 were discarded as burn-in, and samples were drawn from
the chain with a thinning factor of 200. The result was a sample of 17,500
iterations.
The resulting ability parameters ui for the actors and item discrimination
parameters bj for the beliefs were plotted in descending order along with
their highest posterior density (HPD) intervals as a measure of the spread
around estimated positions. The spread around a point estimate (the mean
posterior density) can be due to the uncertainty arising from unstated
beliefs (NAs), self-contradictions on beliefs, and actual variance in beliefs
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(e.g., actors adopting beliefs with different ideological positions). The ability
parameters for the actors represent their ideal points (i.e., locations), with
values below zero indicating classification into the PRO-regulation coalition
and above zero ANTI-regulation. The absolute mean value of the ability par-
ameter, |ui|, was then used to measure the distance from the center of the
ideological scale, which is a measure of the extremeness of an actor’s position
in their coalition. High values represent extreme positions, and low values
represent moderate positions. The spread around an actor’s ideal point was
measured by subtracting the 2.5% HPD value from the 97.5% HPD value,
effectively measuring how clear or how vague the stated position of an
actor was.
Both quantities, extremeness and spread, along with control variables for
frequency of belief statements, a dummy variable for positive versus negative
ideological positions (= ANTI or PRO coalition), and actor types were then
used to explain cross-policy advocacy using a logistic regression model of
the form:
P(integrationi = 1) = logit−1(b0 + b1|ui| + b2(HPD97.5%i − HPD2.5%i )
+ b3freq+ b4[ui , 0]+ b5[typei = RET]+ b6[typei = MAN]
+ b7[typei = POL]+ b8[typei = CHA]+ e),
where integration refers to policy integration or cross-policy advocacy (1 if
an actor is active in both policy debates or 0 if only in one); RET = Retai-
lers; MAN = Manufacturers and associated industries; POL = Political
parties and government actors; and CHA = Health charities and advocacy
organisations.
Three separate models were estimated for joint, mixed, and separate ver-
sions of the dependent variable. The joint model used estimates from a joint
item response model of all actors and beliefs across the two debates. The
advantages are direct comparability of all measures and high statistical
power because the full set of information went into the estimation of pos-
itions. The separate model used parameters estimated either from the MUP
or the SDIL debate for each actor, depending on where the actor was more
active, to predict the actor’s secondary activity in the respective other
policy debate. The advantage is a slightly clearer causal direction (though
all analyses presented here can only establish associations, not causality,
due to the lack of a temporal perspective and a causal research design);
the disadvantage is lower comparability and statistical power as the two
debates were estimated separately and observations from each debate
could not inform inference on the belief system in the other debate, hence
leading to lower accuracy in estimates due to less information. The mixed
model takes a middle ground: Estimates from either MUP or SDIL were
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employed for observations that participated in only one debate while joint
estimates were used for all remaining data points.
The spread variable (HPD97.5%i − HPD2.5%i ) resulted directly from the esti-
mated IRT model, which accounted for the whole belief system and actors’
empirical positions on these beliefs. While it was moderately correlated
with the extremeness of actors’ positions (r = 0.587, p , 0.0001), extreme-
ness of position was controlled for with b1|ui|, hence both effects could be
effectively separated in the model.
In order to pinpoint the precise mechanisms driving the effect of belief
spread, a fourth model was estimated. It included all model terms of the
mixed model (the best-fitting model among the three) and three additional
mechanisms in lieu of belief spread: For each actor, we included (a) the
standard deviation of the estimated discrimination parameters of the
beliefs the actor adopted, weighted positively or negatively depending
on whether the actor supported of rejected the belief (thus measuring
actual belief variance); (b) the number of beliefs over which the actor did
not express opinions (i.e., NAs) as a measure of engagement, where many
unstated beliefs were equivalent to low engagement; and (c) the number
of beliefs over which the actor held contradictory beliefs, i.e., made at
least one supportive and one critical statement. These three mechanisms
were tested to unpack the underlying factor(s) of the belief spread hypoth-
esis as outlined above.
Finally, the best-fitting logit model (among the first three) was used to
predict probabilities for selected scenarios to aid model interpretation.
Descriptive results
Figure 1 shows the estimated ability parameters and their 95% HPD intervals
for the most active actors (those who make at least ten statements). Figure 2
filters these positions by actor type. There is strong clustering by actor type,
with retailers, think tanks, and manufacturers and associated industries being
firmly rooted in the ANTI-regulation coalition and academics, health charities
and advocacy groups as well as health professionals and government health
advisors being predominantly located in the PRO-regulation coalition. Politi-
cal parties and government agencies are spread across the two coalitions. The
opposing positions of health charity/advocacy groups and manufacturers/
associated industries underline the inherent policy conflict between public
health advocates and industrial representatives. Both sides were additionally
supported by scientific or technical expertise of organisations such as the
British Medical Association (BMA) for the PRO-regulation coalition and think
tanks/research analysts like the Institute of Economic Affairs for the ANTI-
regulation coalition (Sabatier, 1988). The leading policy opponents principally
were industry associations like the Wine and Spirit Trade Association and the
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Scotch Whisky Association for the MUP debate and the British Soft Drinks
Association and the Food and Drink Federation for the SDIL debate. The
PRO-regulation coalition was led by the Scottish Government (in the case
Scottish Government − MUP
Commons Health Select Committee − Both
Alcohol Concern − MUP
British Medical Association − Both
Children's Food Campaign − SDIL
Royal College of Physicians − Both
Royal Society for Public Health − SDIL
Public Health England − SDIL
Alcohol Focus Scotland − MUP
Action on Sugar − SDIL
Alcohol Health Alliance − MUP
Chief Medical Officer − Both
National Obesity Forum − SDIL
University of Sheffield − MUP
UK National Health Service − MUP
Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health − SDIL
University of Liverpool − SDIL
World Health Organisation − SDIL
Food Standards Scotland − SDIL
University of California − SDIL
Scottish National Party − Both
Cancer Research UK − SDIL
Faculty of Public Health − SDIL
UK Health Forum − SDIL
Jamie Oliver − SDIL
NHS England − SDIL
UK Government HM Treasury − Both
Academy of Medical Royal Colleges − SDIL
City University London − SDIL
Centre for Addictions Research − MUP
Royal College of Nursing − MUP
Royal College of Physicians Edinburgh − SDIL
Queen Mary University − SDIL
Diabetes UK − SDIL
Police − MUP
Scottish Liberal Democrats − Both
World Obesity Federation − SDIL
Brighton & Hove Council − SDIL
Newcastle University − MUP
General Practitioners − SDIL
Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition − SDIL
National Institute of Alcohol Studies − MUP
Conservatives − Both
Centre for Diet and Activity Research − SDIL
Liberal Democrats − Both
UK Government − Both
Labour − Both
European Spirits Organisation − MUP
Bulgaria − MUP
UK Government Dept of Health − Both
British Retail Consortium − Both
European Commission − MUP
Sainsbury's − Both
Scottish Conservatives − Both
Tesco − Both
Scottish Labour − Both
University of Glasgow − SDIL
SAB Miller − MUP
Office for Budget Responsibility − SDIL
Centre for Economic Business Research − MUP
Associated British Foods − SDIL
Oxford Economics − SDIL
Institute for Fiscal Studies − Both
Scottish Grocers Federation − Both
Portman Group − MUP
Cadbury − SDIL
Britvic − SDIL
AG Barr − SDIL
Irish Beverage Council − SDIL
TaxPayers Alliance − Both
Adam Smith Institute − Both
British Soft Drinks Association − SDIL
Diageo − MUP
Scotch Whisky Association − MUP
Coca−Cola − SDIL
Wine and Spirit Trade Association − MUP
Institute of Economic Affairs − Both
Food and Drink Federation − SDIL
−1 0 1 2
Figure 1. Ideological positions and HPD intervals of the most active actors .
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of MUP) along with health advisors and advocacy groups like Action on Sugar
and Alcohol Concern.
Figure 3 shows the estimated discrimination parameters for policy
beliefs occurring in both debates. The positions are highly correlated
between the two debates (r = 0.872, p , 0.0001), therefore notably
underlining ideological belief similarities in the MUP and SDIL debates
that may serve as common ideological background for actors to partici-
pate in both debates. On the extreme PRO end of the scale, beliefs
such as ‘Policy is supported by evidence’ and ‘Responsibility deals with
the industry are ineffective’ can be found, while the extreme ANTI end
of the scale features beliefs like ‘Policy is illegal’ or ‘Policy will damage
the wider economy’.
Figure 4 summarises the contentiousness of the beliefs using simple
counts, expressed as a percentage (i.e., not based on the scaling). The
most contested beliefs revolved around whether a policy would reduce
University/Academic
Retailer/Retail association Think tank/research/analyst
Police Political party/government
Manufacturers/associated industries & associations NHS/Professional association
Health charity/advocacy group International health bodies
EU member state or EU body Government advisory body
−1 0 1 2
−1 0 1 2
blue points = SDIL, red points = MUP, green points = Both debates
Figure 2. Ideological scaling by actor type.
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the consumption of the commodity and whether legislation was indeed
needed.
Inferential results
Table 1 presents the coefficients and standard errors of the three logit
models. The Mixed model shows a slightly better model fit in terms of the
AIC and log likelihood than the other two models, hence the remaining dis-
cussion and interpretation will focus primarily on this model.
Extremeness of ideology (the absolute value of the ability parameter)
shows a positive and significant (at the 95% level) effect on cross-sectoral
advocacy in all three initial models. In absolute terms, the extremeness of
the ideology coefficient of 2.85 means that a one-point move away from
the zero line on the ideological scale in either direction towards the
extreme ends increases the log-odds of being active in both debates,
rather than only one of them, by 2.85. The MUP ability scale ranges from
−1.27 to +1.10, the SDIL ability scale from −1.01 to +1.34, and the joint
scale from −1.06 to +1.34. The standard deviation of the joint ability par-
ameter of actors is 0.52 (or 0.52 for MUP and 0.50 for SDIL). Moving away
from the ideological zero point by one standard deviation (0.52) towards
the extreme poles would consequently entail an increase in the log-odds
Advertising to young people is a particular issue
Commodity consumption causes health harm
Commodity consumption costs public resources
Commodity consumption falling, does not cause specified health harm
Commodity consumption problem too complex for fiscal solution
Commodity should be regulated like others that cause health harm
Government action on commodity consumption is nanny statist
Government action required on commodity consumption
Greatest health harm from commodity consumption suffered by low−income groups
Industry puts profit before public health
Information and education needed to address commodity consumption
Other fiscal policies are preferable
Policy is an inappropriate intervention in the market
Policy is illegal
Policy is regressive
Policy is supported by evidence
Policy needed to address commodity "problem"
Policy needs to be part of a package of measures
Policy threshold needs to be set high enough to be effective
Policy will damage industry and associated industries
Policy will damage the wider economy
Policy will have unintended adverse health consequences
Policy will improve population health
Policy will raise/save public resources
Policy will reduce consumption of commodity
Population over−consumes commodity
Problematic consumption driven by social and economic conditions
Public supports policy





−2 −1 0 1















Figure 3. Item discrimination parameters for the beliefs observed in both policy
debates.
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of policy integration by 0.52 × 2.85 = 1.48, or an increase of
100 × (e1.48 − 1) = 340% in the odds of engaging in both sectoral debates.
Moving from the average position in the PRO coalition on the left of the
scale (mean of the PRO coalition = −0.42 on the joint scale) to its extreme
end (−1.06) would hence imply a more than five-fold increase in the odds
of being engaged both debates (e(−0.42−(−1.06))×2.85 − 1 = 5.20), and going
from the average position in the ANTI coalition on the right of the scale
(mean of the ANTI coalition = 0.48) to its extreme end (1.33) would
roughly imply a more than ten-fold increase in the odds of cross-sectoral
engagement (e(1.33−0.48)×2.85 − 1 = 10.27), controlling for the extent to
which actors are engaged and the camp they are in. In conclusion, we
reject the null hypothesis that an tor’s ideological position within a coalition
is not associated with cross-sectoral advocacy in favor of the alternative
hypothesis that policy actors with more extreme positions within their
coalition tend to engage in cross-sectoral advocacy efforts.
AgreementDisagreement
Greatest health harm from commodity consumption suffered by low−income groups
Problematic consumption driven by social and economic conditions
Government action on commodity consumption is nanny statist
Public supports policy
Industry puts profit before public health
Policy will damage the wider economy
Policy will have unintended adverse health consequences
Policy is an inappropriate intervention in the market
Other fiscal policies are preferable
Policy threshold needs to be set high enough to be effective
Commodity consumption falling, does not cause specified health harm
Commodity should be regulated like others that cause health harm
Information and education needed to address commodity consumption
Policy will damage industry and associated industries
Commodity consumption problem too complex for fiscal solution
Responsibility deals with industry are ineffective
Advertising to young people is a particular issue
Policy is regressive
Commodity consumption costs public resources
Population over−consumes commodity
Policy needs to be part of a package of measures
Policy will raise/save public resources
Policy is supported by evidence
Policy is illegal
Commodity consumption causes health harm
Government action required on commodity consumption
Policy will improve population health
Policy needed to address commodity "problem"
Policy will reduce consumption of commodity
−10 −5 0 5 10 15




Figure 4. Number of statements for and against each belief, ordered by frequency.
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The spread of an actor’s ideology as measured by the size of the actor’s
95% HPD interval has a negative coefficient of −6.98 in the Mixed model
at a significance level of 99.9%. To put this into context, the smallest recorded
HPD interval has a size of 0.63 and the largest one 2.27 in the Mixed model,
with a mean of 1.66, a median of 1.69, and a standard deviation of 0.33.
Hence an increase of one standard deviation in the size of one’s interval is
associated with a 90% decrease (100× (e0.33×(−6.98) − 1) = −90%) in the
odds of being involved in both policy debates rather than only one. Thus,
the null hypothesis that the spread of the ability HPD does not systematically
covary with cross-sectoral advocacy can be rejected with high confidence in
favour of the alternative hypothesis stating that belief spread leads to lower
chances of cross-sectoral advocacy.
Whether an actor is in the PRO or ANTI coalition does not make a discern-
ible difference for cross-sectoral advocacy. Neither does the activity of an
actor in terms of statement frequency. However, certain actor types exhibit
more (or less) cross-sector advocacy than others: Retailers/retail associations
are among the most consistent opponents of regulation, and they show a
strong tendency for cross-sectoral advocacy efforts as they have an interest
in both products. Although manufacturers and associated industries and
associations are also in the ANTI coalition, they do not show an elevated ten-
dency to engage in cross-sectoral activity as they have an interest in a specific
Table 1. Logistic regression models of cross-sectoral advocacy, with three types of
aggregation for the ideology variables.
Joint Mixed Separate Mixed




−2.39 (1.28)# −2.30 (1.31)# −2.71 (1.26)* −2.33 (1.47)
Political party/government 1.78 (0.83)* 1.57 (0.88)# 2.18 (0.72)** 2.06 (0.89)*
Retailer/retail association 3.43 (1.15)** 3.40 (1.20)** 2.95 (0.96)** 3.21 (1.01)**
Health charity/advocacy
group
−17.36 (1486.97) −17.32 (1467.97) −17.16 (1532.35) −17.96 (1412.46)
Ideology-related variables
Statement frequency in the
media (per 100 statements)
0.02 (0.45) −0.08 (0.46) 0.15 (0.46) −2.28 (1.61)
Member of the pro
coalition (ability > 0)
−0.05 (0.74) −0.10 (0.78) −0.75 (0.69) −1.69 (0.93)#
Extremeness of ideology
(absolute value of ability)
3.08 (1.41)* 2.85 (1.43)* 2.73 (1.26)* −0.58 (1.68)
Spread of ideology (size of
ability HPD)
−6.31 (1.62)*** −6.98 (1.73)*** −4.47 (1.51)**
Belief variance −0.02 (0.77)
Number of unstated beliefs −0.36 (0.10)***
Self-contradictions 0.72 (0.60)
AIC 92.36 87.22 102.71 89.19
BIC 123.57 118.43 133.92 127.34
Log likelihood −37.18 −34.61 −42.35 −33.59
Num. obs. 237 237 237 237
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; #p < 0.1.
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product. To the contrary, they seem less inclined to participate in both sectors
than other actors (with a borderline-significant result). In the PRO coalition,
the main group of proponents of the regulation of unhealthy commodities,
the health charities and advocacy groups, do not show a statistically detect-
able association with cross-sector advocacy efforts. Finally, one would expect
political parties and government actors, who were divided over the issue, to
engage in both policy debates as they have a mediating position between
societal interests in pluralist and corporatist interest intermediation. Indeed,
there is a positive and significant effect at the 95% confidence level in the
Joint model, 90% level in the Mixed model, and at the 99% level in the Sep-
arate model, with coefficients ranging from 1.57 to 2.18.
To aid interpretation of these effects, Figure 5 presents predicted probabil-
ities for nine scenarios, with average/typical values on all variables unless
otherwise stated. Retailers in the ANTI coalition with extreme ideology (i.e.,
the maximum value) and a low belief spread (i.e., the empirically observable
minimum of the HPD interval sizes of all actors) are almost certain to engage
in both policy debates. Moving from extreme and consistent beliefs to
average positions within their coalition and an average spread brings the
probability of engaging in both debates down to around 0.4, which is still
larger on average (though not significantly so) than the baseline probability
of 0.11, as eleven per cent of all actors engaged in both debates. Manufac-
turers and associated industries with extreme ideologies and low spread
also show a high probability (around 95%) of being active in both debates,
but as soon as their ideological position and spread are changed to
average within-coalition levels, their probability of cross-sectoral activity
goes down to close to zero. This supports the results from the regression
table that manufacturers and associated industries per se do not show a sig-
nificant effect, and it is really the position and spread that drive the high
Political party or government actor with extreme within−coalition ideology and spread
Political party or government actor with average within−coalition ideology and spread
Health advocacy group in the PRO camp with extreme ideology and small spread
Average actor in the PRO camp
Average actor in the ANTI camp
Manufacturer/associated industry in the ANTI camp with average ideology and average spread
Retailer with in the ANTI camp with average ideology and average spread
Manufacturer/associated industry in the ANTI camp with extreme ideology and small spread
Retailer with in the ANTI camp with extreme ideology and small spread
0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2






Figure 5. Predicted probabilities of cross-policy advocacy for nine hypothetical scen-
arios, based on the second model (‘Mixed’). Point prediction marked by a red cross,
with the 95% confidence interval represented by error bars.
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probability for this group. The average probability in the ANTI group for any
actor is in the low single-digit range, and the average probability in the PRO
camp is lower than 0.01, confirming that coalition membership per se is not
responsible for the variation. Health charity and advocacy groups in the PRO
coalition, even when they have an extreme position and low ideological
spread, have a very small probability of cross-sectoral advocacy engagement.
This is noteworthy for two reasons. First, the two main hypotheses seem to
hold irrespective of coalition or actor type unless the actor is a health
charity or advocacy group, in which case belief alignment is not able to
motivate actors to engage in both debates at all. Second, this result speaks
to the isolation of actors in the PRO coalition observed elsewhere (Hilton
et al., 2020). Health charities and advocacy groups missed out on the poten-
tial to mobilise across debates, despite presumably firm beliefs in their cause.
Finally, political parties and government actors show more cross-sectoral
coordination than other actor types, but the last two scenarios show that
this is driven to a large extent by the two main variables, belief extremeness
and spread. With average beliefs and spread within their respective coalitions,
their probability of cross-policy activity is rather close to zero.
In an additional model specification reported in the last column of Table 1,
we tested whether the composite variable of ideological spread could be
further unpacked into constituent factors, following the discussion of three
underpinning mechanisms above. Ideological spread affects cross-sectoral
advocacy most systematically through the number of unstated beliefs,
which is the only significant predictor among the three. Actors who specialise
on a few selected beliefs in the policy debate are estimated to have a large
ideological spread by the IRT model because their belief portfolio leaves
much room for speculation about the beliefs they do not reference. In line
with the hypothesis, such lack of engagement leads to a lower propensity
to engage in cross-sectoral activities and an exclusive focus on a single
policy debate. As hypothesised, a lack of engagement through the number
of unstated beliefs is also correlated with the extremeness of one’s ideologi-
cal position; hence the number of unstated beliefs acts as a mediator both for
spread and extremeness, which becomes apparent by the now insignificant
coefficient for extremeness of beliefs. Were this uncertainty in the posterior
distribution factored directly into the estimation of the effect of extremeness
on cross-sectoral advocacy, instead of using the posterior mean as a point
estimate, then this would consequently lead to an insignificant result for
extremeness. Actors who hold extreme beliefs state their beliefs explicitly
and engage in cross-sectoral advocacy. Actors who hold moderate beliefs
engage less and show a lower probability of cross-sectoral advocacy. Control-
ling for engagement thus renders the extremeness of ideology over and
above engagement unimportant. The variance of the beliefs that are
indeed stated, as measured through the standard deviation of the positively
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or negatively weighted discrimination parameters of stated beliefs per actor,
is not a significant mediator of the effect of spread. Neither is the number of
beliefs over which actors contradict themselves. Thus, extreme beliefs and
low spread in expressed beliefs jointly determine cross-sectoral advocacy
efforts. They are jointly mediated by lack of engagement.
Conclusion
Explanations of cross-sectoral advocacy have been somewhat opaque in the
literature on policy processes and advocacy. The empirical evidence in this
study suggests that belief system alignment is associated with such efforts.
This speaks to the literature on advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1998) and
policy entrepreneurship across boundaries (Faling et al., 2019). Extreme
and well-defined ideological positions relative to one’s coalition are associ-
ated with more cross-sectoral advocacy efforts across similar policy
debates. This is irrespective of frequency of involvement and coalition mem-
bership but may hold more for some actor types (here: retailers, manufac-
turers) than others (health charities and advocacy groups). Future research
will need to replicate this finding in other contexts and case studies to find
out what kinds of actor types demonstrate this behaviour (or absence of
behaviour) systematically.
More research is also needed regarding the causal direction of the relation-
ships documented here. Theoretically, it may be more plausible that belief
system alignment and engagement cause cross-sectoral advocacy than that
positions and ideological uncertainty are caused by cross-sectoral policy
debate participation. This reverse causal path should be either confirmed
or eliminated in future research. While the observations on both beliefs
and cross-sectoral advocacy are temporal over the course of several years,
the observations had to be aggregated into a cross-sectional dataset to
permit ideological scaling. It may be possible to obtain temporally smoothed
ideological positions with temporal variation to construct a panel or event
history dataset, but the obtained estimates would likely be much less
precise and might fail to permit inference on the role of relative position
and spread.
The literature on policy containers and expanders posits that those
wishing to contain a policy try to sweep the policy under the rug by also con-
taining actor involvement in the debate (e.g., Schaub &Metz, 2020). Ironically,
policy containers seem to be precisely the ones who engage in multiple sec-
toral debates to attain this goal.
The methodological approach taken in this article is novel in the field of
advocacy research and policy processes. The application of IRT to the
coalition structure in policy debates permits simultaneous estimation of the
belief system position of actors and beliefs relative to each other as well as
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the discriminatory power of policy beliefs for coalition membership. This
approach not only lends itself to explaining advocacy behaviour but also
allows principled description of coalitions in a policy debate by reverting to
the belief categories of which advocacy coalitions are composed. The
approach can be applied to media text data (like in this analysis) or any
other text data exhibiting actors’ positions on relevant policy beliefs, with
the caveat that each type of source document may only depict a certain
‘arena’ of the entire underlying actor and belief constellation. The method
complements approaches stressing the complexity and higher-order dimen-
sionality of subsystems and coalitions, such as discourse network analysis
(Leifeld, 2013; 2017), by offering a scaling solution for policy debates,
which can be intrinsically one-dimensional (though this may depend on
the type of belief measured and is ultimately an empirical question). We rec-
ommend this approach over more complex approaches like discourse
network analysis when it is clear that the ideological spectrum is one-dimen-
sional (e.g., a debate around a single policy), while discourse network analysis
is more appropriate for the analysis of whole subsystems with multiple pol-
icies or cleavage lines, as in Leifeld (2013), or policy conflicts with multiple
non-opposite policy options on the table.
Finally, the case examined here suggests a significant unrealised potential
for cross-sectoral policy advocacy efforts by public health charities and advo-
cacy groups. Their opponents in the conflict around unhealthy commodity
regulation already leverage cross-policy synergies as a strategic resource to
strengthen their advocacy efforts, and the PRO-regulation camp would do
well to adopt the same strategy in the interest of public health. However,
future research is needed to evaluate howmuch more effective cross-sectoral
advocacy really is compared to policy specialisation in a single debate.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback. SH,
GF and CB were supported by UK Medical Research Council and Chief Scientist Office
core funding as part of the MRC/CSO Social and Public Health Sciences Unit Policy pro-
gramme (2015-2020), MC_UU_12017/15; SPHSU15; and Complexity in Health pro-
gramme (2020-2025), MC_UU_00022/1; SPHSU16.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributors
Philip Leifeld is a Professor of Comparative Politics in the Department of Government
at the University of Essex, UK.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 21
Tim Henrichsen is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the Department of Politics and Inter-
national Studies at the University of Warwick, UK.
Christina Buckton is a Research Assistant in the MRC/CSO Social & Public Health
Sciences Unit at the University of Glasgow, UK.
Gillian Fergie is a Postdoctoral Research Associate in the MRC/CSO Social & Public
Health Sciences Unit at the University of Glasgow, UK.
Shona Hilton is a Professor of Public Health Policy and Deputy Director of the MRC/








Albert, J. H. (1992). Bayesian estimation of normal ogive item response curves using
Gibbs sampling. Journal of Educational Statistics, 17(3), 251–269. https://doi.org/
10.3102/10769986017003251
Brandenberger, L., Ingold, K., Fischer, M., Schläpfer, I., & Leifeld, P. (2021). Boundary
spanning through engagement of policy actors in multiple issues. Policy Studies
Journal. Forthcoming. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12404
Buckton, C. H., Fergie, G., Leifeld, P., & Hilton, S. (2019). A discourse network analysis of
UK newspaper coverage of the “sugar tax” debate before and after the announce-
ment of the Soft Drinks Industry levy. BMC Public Health, 19(1), 1–14. https://doi.org/
10.1186/s12889-019-6799-9
Candel, J. J. (2017). Holy grail or inflated expectations? The success and failure of inte-
grated policy strategies. Policy Studies, 38(6), 519–552. https://doi.org/10.1080/
01442872.2017.1337090
Clinton, J., Jackman, S., & Rivers, D. (2004). The statistical analysis of roll call data.
American Political Science Review, 98(2), 355–370. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0003055404001194
Cobb, R. W., & Coughlin, J. F. (1998). Are elderly drivers a road hazard? Problem
definition and political impact. Journal of Aging Studies, 12(4), 411–427. https://
doi.org/10.1016/S0890-4065(98)90027-5
Collin, J., Hill, S. E., Eltanani, M. K., Plotnikova, E., Ralston, R., & Smith, K. E. (2017). Can
public health reconcile profits and pandemics? An analysis of attitudes to commer-
cial sector engagement in health policy and research. PloS ONE, 12(9), e0182612.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182612
Däubler, T., & Benoit, K. (2017). Estimating better left-right positions through statistical
scaling of manual content analysis. Unpublished Manuscript. https://pdfs.
semanticscholar.org/9eb7/6a90e29fe43db2c4192ef2df5f4d73aa0567.pdf (accessed
9 March 2021).
22 P. LEIFELD ET AL.
Faling, M., Biesbroek, R., Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, S., & Termeer, K. (2019). Policy entrepre-
neurship across boundaries: A systematic literature review. Journal of Public Policy,
39(2), 393–422. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X18000053
Fergie, G., Leifeld, P., Hawkins, B., & Hilton, S. (2019). Mapping discourse coalitions in the
minimum unit pricing for alcohol debate: A discourse network analysis of UK news-
paper coverage. Addiction, 114(4), 741–753. https://doi.org/10.1111/add.14514
Fischer, F., & Forester, J. (1993). The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning.
Duke University Press.
Freudenberg, N. (2014). Lethal but Legal: Corporations, Consumption, and Protecting
Public Health. Oxford University Press.
Heaney, M. T., & Leifeld, P. (2018). Contributions by interest groups to lobbying
coalitions. Journal of Politics, 80(2), 494–509. https://doi.org/10.1086/694545
Henry, A. D., Lubell, M., & McCoy, M. (2011). Belief systems and social capital as drivers
of policy network structure: The case of california regional planning. Journal of
Public Administration Research and Theory, 21(3), 419–444. https://doi.org/10.
1093/jopart/muq042
Hilton, S., Buckton, C. H., Henrichsen, T., Fergie, G., & Leifeld, P. (2020). Policy congru-
ence and advocacy strategies in the discourse networks of minimum unit pricing for
alcohol and the soft drinks industry levy. Addiction, 115(12), 2303–2314. https://doi.
org/10.1111/add.15068
Ingold, K. (2011). Network structures within policy processes: Coalitions, power, and
brokerage in Swiss climate policy. Policy Studies Journal, 39(3), 435–459. https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2011.00416.x
Ingold, K., & Leifeld, P. (2016). Structural and institutional determinants of influence
reputation: A comparison of collaborative and adversarial policy networks in
decision making and implementation. Journal of Public Administration Research
and Theory, 26(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muv041
Jenkins-Smith, H. C., St. Clair, G. K., & Woods, B. (1991). Explaining change in policy sub-
systems: Analysis of coalition stability and defection over time. American Journal of
Political Science, 35(4), 851–880. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111497 .
Junk, W. M. (2019). When diversity works: The effects of coalition composition on the
success of lobbying coalitions. American Journal of Political Science, 63(3), 660–674.
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12437
Laffont, J. J., & Tirole, J. (1991). The politics of government decision-making: A theory of
regulatory capture. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1089–1127. https://
doi.org/10.2307/2937958
Leifeld, P. (2013). Reconceptualizing major policy change in the advocacy coalition fra-
mework: A discourse network analysis of German pension politics. Policy Studies
Journal, 41(1), 169–198. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12007
Leifeld, P. (2017). Discourse network analysis: Policy debates as dynamic networks. In J.
N. Victor, A. H. Montgomery, & M. N. Lubell (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political
Networks (pp. 301–325). Oxford University Press.
Leifeld, P., & Haunss, S. (2012). Political discourse networks and the conflict over soft-
ware patents in Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 51(3), 382–409.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.02003.x
Mahoney, C. (2007). Networking vs. allying: The decision of interest groups to join
coalitions in the US and the EU. Journal of European Public Policy, 14(3), 366–383.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760701243764
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 23
Martin, A. D., Quinn, K. M., & Park, J. H. (2011). MCMCpack: Markov chain Monte
Carlo in R. Journal of Statistical Software, 42(9), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.18637/
jss.v042.i09
Moodie, R., Stuckler, D., Monteiro, C., Sheron, N., Neal, B., Thamarangsi, T., Lincoln, P., &
Casswell, S. (2013). Profits and pandemics: Prevention of harmful effects of tobacco,
alcohol, and ultra-processed food and drink industries. The Lancet, 381(9867), 670–
679. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(12)62089-3
Petticrew, M., Shemilt, I., Lorenc, T., Marteau, T. M., Melendez-Torres, G. J., O’Mara-Eves,
A., Stautz, K., & Thomas, J. (2017). Alcohol advertising and public health: Systems
perspectives versus narrow perspectives. Journal of Epidemiology and Community
Health, 71(3), 308–312. https://doi.org/10.1136/jech-2016-207644
Sabatier, P. A. (1988). An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role
of policy-oriented learning therein. Policy Sciences, 21(2-3), 129–168. https://doi.org/
10.1007/BF00136406
Sabatier, P. A. (1998). The advocacy coalition framework: Revisions and relevance for
Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 5(1), 98–130. https://doi.org/10.1080/
13501768880000051
Savell, E., Fooks, G., & Gilmore, A. B. (2016). How does the alcohol industry attempt to
influence marketing regulations? A systematic review. Addiction, 111(1), 18–32.
https://doi.org/10.1111/add.13048
Schaub, S., & Metz, F. (2020). Comparing discourse and policy network approaches:
Evidence from water policy on micropollutants. Politics and Governance, 8(2),
184–199. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i2.2597
Smith, K., Dorfman, L., Freudenberg, N., Hawkins, B., Hilton, S., Razum, O., & Weishaar,
H. (2016). Tobacco, alcohol, and processed food industries–why do public health
practitioners view them so differently? Frontiers in Public Health, 4(64), 1–3.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2016.00064
Tosun, J., & Lang, A. (2017). Policy integration: Mapping the different concepts. Policy
Studies, 38(6), 553–570. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2017.1339239
Tosun, J., & Schaub, S. (2017). Mobilization in the European public sphere: The struggle
over genetically modified organisms. Review of Policy Research, 34(3), 310–330.
https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12235
Trein, P., Meyer, I., & Maggetti, M. (2019). The integration and coordination of public
policies: A systematic comparative review. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis,
21(4), 332–349. https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2018.1496667
24 P. LEIFELD ET AL.
